Why is it worth thinking about Malcolm Gladwell?

Because Malcolm takes the politically correct conventional wisdom (you can’t make useful predictions about people, heredity doesn’t matter, just environment and effort, etcetera etcetera) seriously enough to apply it in all sorts of situations where a more prudent hack would shy away, making him the a One-Man Reductio ad Absurdum of fashionable thought.

Malcolm is the mirror image me. I’m always looking for novel ways to poke holes in the ruling discourse, to point out that the ideological emperor has no clothes; and Malcolm’s always looking for ways to validate what passes for thought in polite society.

Of course, we end up demonstrating the same thing, as shown by the differing responses we get. Poor Malcolm gets laughed at because he gets so many things wrong, while I get sputtered at because I get so many things right.

With his complaining letter to the New York Times having received a terse thumping at the hands of Steven Pinker, Malcolm Gladwell revisits the question of whether or not draft position is correlated with an NFL quarterback’s career on his blog. (more…)

In the 1970s and 1980s, Bill James put a lot of effort into predicting how well young players would do. In 1988, he summed up 15 things he’d learned, and three of them related to forecasting young players’ development:

• Minor league batting statistics will predict major league batting performance with essentially the same reliability as previous major league statistics.
• Players taken in the June draft coming out of college (or with at least two years of college) perform dramatically better than players drafted out of high school.
• The chance of getting a good player with a high draft pick is substantial enough that it is clearly a disastrous strategy to give up a first round draft choice to sign a mediocre free agent.

James essentially found, unsurprisingly, that the closer players got to the majors, the easier it is to predict their major league performance. Minor league hitters can be predicted reasonably well from statistics alone. Drafting college players was usually safer than drafting high school players. High draft pick high school pitchers, I believe, were especially likely to flame out. (more…)

In the New York Times here.

You’ve already seen Malcolm Gladwell’s letter, with his ad hominem attack on me as a crimethinker. I’d half-assumed that the NYT would cut that part out in the interests of saving space, but they left it in.

From the NYT:

Steven Pinker replies:

What Malcolm Gladwell calls a “lonely ice floe” is what psychologists call “the mainstream.” In a 1997 editorial in the journal Intelligence, 52 signatories wrote, “I.Q. is strongly related, probably more so than any other single measurable human trait, to many important educational, occupational, economic and social outcomes.” Similar conclusions were affirmed in a unanimous blue-ribbon report by the American Psychological Association, and in recent studies (some focusing on outliers) by Dean Simonton, David Lubinski and others.

Gladwell is right, of course, to privilege peer-reviewed articles over blogs. But sports is a topic in which any academic must answer to an army of statistics-savvy amateurs, and in this instance, I judged, the bloggers were correct. They noted, among other things, that Berri and Simmons weakened their “weak correlation” (Gladwell described it in the New Yorker essay reprinted in “What the Dog Saw” as “no connection”) by omitting the lower-drafted quarterbacks who, unsurprisingly, turned out not to merit many plays. In any case, the relevance to teacher selection (the focus of the essay) remains tenuous.

As a commenter pointed out, this debate over NFL quarterbacks is really a stalking horse for the debate over IQ and race, which, in turn, influences practically every other concept about how the world works. (more…)

Yes, America clearly needs a close analysis of the President of the United States’ first book. But who could possibly know where to find such a thing?

In my Wednesday Taki’s Magazine column, I use a popular football argument to explain the philosophy behind why my punditry is so off-kilter from everybody else’s.

Last Sunday evening, while watching the final minutes of the now famous Indianapolis Colts - New England Patriots football game, I experienced a moment of middle-aged serenity. I realized that I didn’t actually need to have an opinion on perhaps the leading topic of office water cooler debate in this decade: Which quarterback is better—the Colt’s Peyton Manning or the Patriot’s Tom Brady?

I could just sit back and enjoy the show.

The everlasting Brady-Manning controversy reminded me of an epistemological insight that Harvard cognitive scientist Steven Pinker suggested when I interviewed him in 2002 during his book tour for his bestseller The Blank Slate. It didn’t fully register upon me at the time, but what has stuck with me the longest is Pinker’s concept that “mental effort seems to be engaged most with the knife edge at which one finds extreme and radically different consequences with each outcome, but the considerations militating towards each one are close to equal.”

To put it another way, the things that we most like to argue about are those that are most inherently arguable, such as: Who would win in a fight, Tom Brady or Peyton Manning?...

Read the rest here and comment upon it here.

Terry McDermott blogs for the Columbia Journalism Review:

Criticism of Gladwell Reaches Tipping Point

… I should add here that my hatred of Gladwell is boundless, at least the equal of any critic, but I, a much more rigorous (and therefore slower and much poorer) writer, at least know its source – pure unadulterated jealousy.

Gladwell’s earlier books The Tipping Point, Blink, and Outliers have been publishing phenomena. Tipping Point alone has been on bestseller lists for five years. Gladwell in many ways is the social science equivalent of the New York Times foreign affairs columnist Tom Friedman, another favorite target of critics whose books sell huge numbers. Both are popularizers, in some sense hucksters, adept at phrase-making and simplifying (and often over-simplifying) complex subjects. A key difference, however, is that when Friedman is wrong, he helps start wars. When Gladwell makes a mistake, he dilutes public understanding of science – not a good thing, surely, but he’s a feature writer; that’s what they do.

There is plenty of reason to criticize Malcolm Gladwell, but you get the sense that his chief flaw is being popular.

The comparison to Tom Friedman is a valid one.

Still, “being popular” correlates with being influential. That Malcolm is a tireless and influential proponent of wrong ideas is a problem, especially as his ideas take on (particularly in his most recent bestseller Outliers) an increasingly coherent and politicized form that reinforces and extends the dumbest tendencies in the conventional wisdom.

From the standpoint of the general welfare, there are two potential solutions for the Gladwell Problem: either Malcolm becomes less wrong or he becomes less influential. I would prefer the former solution, but Malcolm seems hellbent on the latter.

More fund-raising …

I wanted to thank everybody who has contributed so far (and guilt-trip everbody who hasn’t).

There are, at the moment, three ways to give me money.

You can make tax deductible credit card contributions to me here (then, under “Steve Sailer Project Option” click on the “Make a Donation” button); or fax credit card details here (please put “Steve Sailer Project” on the fax); or you can snail mail checks made out to “VDARE Foundation” and marked on the memo line (lower left corner) “Steve Sailer” to:

VDARE Foundation
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Second: You can send me an email and I’ll send you my P.O. Box address.

Third: You can use Paypal to send me money directly, either by just using any credit card or if you have a specific Paypal account. [More]

Is now up in a gated version of Personality and Individual Differences. Here is the beginning and the end:

Abstract: Richard Nisbett’s intelligence and how to get it advances several interlocking claims: (1) the heritability of IQ is far lower than typically claimed by behavioral geneticists, (2) the IQ differences across social classes are largely environmental in origin, (3) the IQ differences across racial groups are entirely environmental in origin, and (4) these group differences can be narrowed substantially by interventions that social scientists have already discovered. In this review I show that Nisbett’s arguments are consistently overstated or unsound. …

Conclusion: Continued research with the tools of genetic epidemiology, population genetics, psychometrics, and cognitive neuroscience is likely to settle many of the contentious issues raised in Nisbett’s book, even without a centralized effort toward any such narrow goal. Given that much of the critical research so clearly lies ahead, Nisbett’s certainty regarding his own premature conclusions is quite remarkable. Some of this may be owed to the disturbing possibilities raised by the alternatives. Even the prospect that current group differences might be eliminated by a combination of biological enhancement and environmental improvement will fail to put all observers at ease, since the prospect of biologically based remedies is itself frightening to many. For what it is worth, I believe that the possibilities regarding both the state of nature and our powers of control should leave us reasonably optimistic about what the future might hold. But I confess to less than total confidence in even this qualified remark, and I envy Nisbett his certitude.

Let’s continue kibbitzing in the argument between Steven Pinker and Malcolm Gladwell over Gladwell’s contention that “In fact, Berri and Simmons found no connection between where a quarterback was taken in the draft—that is, how highly he was rated on the basis of his college performance—and how well he played in the pros.”

The mass of evidence suggests that, yes, there is a correlation between where a quarterback is selected in the draft and how well he’ll do. Let’s note, however, that the correlation glass is half full. For example, Peyton Manning, winner of tonight’s 35-34 come-from-behind win over Tom Brady’s New England Patriots, was chosen first overall in the 1998 NFL draft. On the other hand, Brady, whose 4th and 2 pass on his own 28 with two minutes left, was juggled by the receiver, costing New England the win, was chosen 199th in the 2000 NFL draft.

I’ve now read the most recent paper by Gladwell’s favorites, economists David J. Berri and Rob Simmons, “Catching a Draft:”

Our analysis revealed that there was a relationship between aggregate performance and where a player was chosen. But when we looked at per play performance, the relationship between production and draft position was quite weak. In contrast, a much stronger relationship existed between how many plays a quarterback ran and where he was selected. In sum, draft position can get a quarterback on the field. But quarterbacks taken higher do not appear to perform any better.

But, Berri is using a very, very slippery approach. (more…)

Was Steven Pinker correct when dismissing in the New York Times Malcolm Gladwell’s New Yorker article “Most Likely to Succeed” with the words, “It is simply not true that a quarter­back’s rank in the draft is uncorrelated with his success in the pros”?

Gladwell’s statement of his position is quite uncompromising:

This is the quarterback problem. There are certain jobs where almost nothing you can learn about candidates before they start predicts how they’ll do once they’re hired. So how do we know whom to choose in cases like that? … The problem with picking quarterbacks is that [U. of Missouri quarterback] Chase Daniel’s performance can’t be predicted. The job he’s being groomed for is so particular and specialized that there is no way to know who will succeed at it and who won’t. In fact, Berri and Simmons found no connection between where a quarterback was taken in the draft—that is, how highly he was rated on the basis of his college performance—and how well he played in the pros.

“No connection” is not, in fact, the position of economists David J. Berri and Rob Simmons, whose new paper “Catching a Draft” (gated and therefore I haven’t read it) has the following abstract: (more…)